Abstract. Despite their widespread usage in block cipher security, linear and differential cryptanalysis still lack a robust treatment of their success probability, and the success chances of these attacks have commonly been estimated in a rather ad hoc fashion. In this paper, we present an analytical calculation of the success probability of linear and differential cryptanalytic attacks. The results apply to an extended sense of the term "success" where the correct key is found not necessarily as the highest-ranking candidate but within a set of high-ranking candidates. Experimental results show that the analysis provides accurate results in most cases, especially in linear cryptanalysis. In cases where the results are less accurate, as in certain cases of differential cryptanalysis, the results are useful to provide approximate estimates of the success probability and the necessary plaintext requirement. The analysis also reveals that the attacked key length in differential cryptanalysis is one of the factors that affect the success probability directly besides the signal-to-noise ratio and the available plaintext amount.
Introduction
Differential cryptanalysis (DC) [1] and linear cryptanalysis (LC) [11, 12] are two of the most important techniques in block cipher cryptanalysis today. Virtually every modern block cipher has its security checked against these attacks and a number of them have actually been broken. Despite this widespread utilization, evaluation of the success probability of these attacks is usually done in a rather ad hoc fashion: Success chances of differential attacks are typically evaluated according to the empirical observations based on the "signal-to-noise ratio" [1] . In the case of linear cryptanalysis, arbitrary ciphers are analyzed using Matsui's results for his DES attacks [11, 12] , which were in fact carefully calculated for and were specific to those particular attacks.
In this paper, we present an analytical, generally applicable calculation of the success probability of linear and differential attacks. Throughout the analysis, a generalized definition of the term "success" is dealt with: If an attack on an m-bit key gets the correct value ranked among the top r out of 2 m possible candidates, we say the attack obtained an (m − lg r)-bit advantage over exhaustive search. The traditional, more strict definition of success, where the attack discovers the right key as the first candidate, corresponds to obtaining an m-bit advantage over an m-bit key.
The analysis presented provides formulas for direct calculation of the success probability of linear and differential attacks. The amount of data required for an attack to achieve a certain success probability can also be calculated through these formulas. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the aimed advantage level-that is, in more traditional terms, the number of key bits attacked-is one of the factors that affect the success probability in differential cryptanalysis directly besides the already established factors of the signal-to-noise ratio and the expected number of right pairs.
The notations in the paper common to all sections include φ and for the probability density and the cumulative distribution functions of the standard normal distribution. Besides, B, N , and P are used for denoting the binomial, normal, and Poisson distributions, respectively.
Success Probability in Linear Cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis, developed by Matsui [11] , is a known-plaintext attack that exploits the statistical correlation among the plaintext, ciphertext, and key bits of a block cipher to discover the encryption key. The first step in a linear attack is to find a linear approximation for the cipher. A linear approximation is a binary equation of the bits of the plaintext, ciphertext, and the key, which holds with a probability p = 1/2. The quantity |p − 1/2|, known as the bias, is a measure of correlation among the plaintext, ciphertext, and key bits, and it can be used to distinguish the actual key from random key values. In an attack, the attacker collects a large number of plaintext-ciphertext blocks, and for each possible key value he counts the number of plaintext-ciphertext blocks that satisfy the approximation. Assuming that the bias of the approximation with the right key will be significantly higher than the bias with a random key, the key value that maximizes the bias over the given plaintext sample is taken as the right key.
In general, it may be sufficient to have the right key ranked reasonably high among the candidates rather than having it as the absolute highest. For example, in Matsui's attack on DES, a 26-bit portion of the key was attacked where the right key was ranked among the top 2 13 . In this kind of ranking attacks, all candidates ranked higher than the right key must be tried before the right key can be reached. Each candidate must be checked with all combinations of the remaining, unattacked bits to see if it is the right value. In such an attack, where an m-bit key is attacked and the right key is ranked rth among all 2 m candidates, the attack provides a complexity reduction by a factor of 2 m−lg r over the exhaustive search. In our analysis, we refer to m − lg r as the advantage provided by the attack.
Problem Statement
Consider the problem where an attacker is interested in getting the right key ranked within the r top candidates among a total of 2 m keys, where an m-bit key is attacked, with an approximation of probability p, using N plaintext blocks. Let k 0 denote the right key and k i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 m − 1, be the wrong key values, and let n denote 2 m − 1. Let X i = T i /N − 1/2 and Y i = |X i |, where T i is the counter for the plaintexts satisfying the approximation with key k i . Let W i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 m − 1, be the Y i , i = 0, sorted in increasing order. That is, W 1 is the lowest sample bias |T i /N − 1/2| obtained among the wrong keys, W n is the highest. Then, the two conditions for the success of the attack are
that is, T 0 /N − 1/2 and p − 1/2 have the same sign, and
In the rest of this analysis, we assume for simplicity that p > 1/2. 1 Hence, the two conditions become
This modeling of the success probability was originally given by Junod [7] , where he derived an expression of the success probability in terms of Euler's incomplete beta integral assuming that the T i s are independent and they are identically distributed for i = 0. He also presented a numerical calculation of that expression for Matsui's 26-bit DES attack [12] assuming that the approximation has a zero bias for a wrong key, i.e.,
Here, we present a more general calculation of the success probability using the normal approximation for order statistics. Like Junod, we also assume the independence of the T i counters and a zero bias for the wrong keys. Since the zero bias for the wrong keys is the ideal case for an attacker, the results can be seen as an upper bound for the actual success probability.
Order Statistics
In this section we give a brief review of order statistics, as treated in [13] . Theorem 1, the key for our analysis, states the normal approximation for the order statistics. 
where
n .
Taking i(n) = qn + 1, the theorem states that the empirical sample quantile of order q of a sample of n elements is for sufficiently large n nearly normally distributed with
Success Probability
The sample bias of the right key, X 0 = T 0 /N − 1/2, approximately follows a normal distribution N (μ 0 , σ 2 0 ) with μ 0 = p − 1/2 and σ 2 0 = 1/(4N). The absolute sample bias of wrong keys, Y i , i = 0, follow a folded normal distribution (see Appendix 4) FN (μ w , σ 2 w ) with μ w = 0, assuming a zero bias for wrong keys, and σ 2 w = 1/(4N). We use f 0 , F 0 and f w , F w to denote the probability density and the cumulative distribution functions of X 0 and Y i , i = 0, respectively.
In an a-bit advantage attack on an m-bit key, success is defined as 
since F w is folded normal. Then the probability of success, P S , is
For a, m ≥ 8, we have μ q > 5σ q and, therefore, the probability of Wr < 0 is negligible. Hence, (5) and (6) can be combined as
Since both X 0 and Wr follow a normal distribution, X 0 − Wr follows a normal distribution too, which we denote by F J , with mean μ 0 − μ q and variance σ 2 0 + σ 2 q . Therefore, Table 1 gives a numeric calculation of (9) for certain values of a and m, with N = 8|p − 1/2| −2 plaintext blocks.
In Table 1 , it is interesting that P S is almost independent of the key length m for a given a. Note that, for 8 ≤ a ≤ 48, σ q satisfies 10 −6 ≤ σ q /σ 0 ≤ 10 −1 . Especially when dealing with success probabilities of 80% or more, the effect of σ q is negligible and we can assume σ 2 0 + σ 2 q ≈ σ 0 . Then (9) becomes
where the success probability is a function of the advantage level a, independent of the number of key bits attacked m. In (10), F w is the folded normal distribution FN (0, σ 2 w ), and
, yielding the following main result:
Theorem 2. Let P S be the probability that a linear attack on an m-bit subkey, with a linear approximation of probability p, with N known plaintext blocks, delivers an abit or higher advantage. Assuming that the linear approximation's probability to hold is independent for each key tried and is equal to 1/2 for all wrong keys, we have, for sufficiently large m and N ,
A numerical calculation of (11) is shown in Table 2 , where the success probability is given as a function of the aimed advantage level a and c N , the amount of available plaintexts as a multiple of |p − 1/2| −2 (i.e., c N = N/|p − 1/2| −2 ). A comparison of the Table 1 . The success probability P S according to (9) columns of Table 1 to the column of Table 2 for c N = 8 shows that the two are almost identical. Equation (11) implies that 2
, yielding a direct formula to calculate the required number of plaintexts to achieve a certain success probability P S :
Corollary 1. With the assumptions of Theorem 2,
plaintext blocks are needed in a linear attack to accomplish an a-bit advantage with a success probability of P S .
Discussion of the Assumptions and Experimental Results
In a typical linear attack, N is at least in the order of 2 20 and p is very close to 1/2. Hence, the normal approximation for the binomial T i counters and for X i = (T i /N − 1/2) can be expected to be extremely good. Regarding the normal approximation for the order statistics, the sample size is n = 2 m − 1, which can be expected to give accurate results for fairly large values of m [16] . For a practical evaluation, we implemented Matsui's 8-round DES attack [12] and compared the actual success probability to the results of (11) . The attack uses a 6-round DES approximation with a bias 1.95 · 2 −9 and targets the keys of S5 in the first and the eighth rounds, with 12 key bits in total. 2 In the experiments the attack was run 10,000 times for each value of N .
The success probability according to the experimental results and according to (11) are compared in Fig. 1 . Figure 1(a) shows that (11) gives a quite precise calculation of the success probability for most cases. The exception to this accuracy, as Figure 1(b) shows, is when the top ranking probability is of concern and with a relatively small P S value, in which case about a 10% error rate is possible. 2 The benefit of using DES in this experiment is that, it was observed in [15] that the bias of linear approximations of DES-like ciphers can be estimated accurately by the piling-up lemma [11] , which is not always the case for other ciphers (e.g., RC5). Hence, using DES as the test cipher, the experiments can be conducted free of the errors that would result from a miscalculation of the bias. (b) The same plots with a focus on the range 1-10. Now a difference can be observed, especially when the top ranking probability is of concern. The theoretical and practical results are still indistinguishable for N = 2 20 . 
Probability of Top Ranking
A more precise calculation of the success probability is possible for the special case a = m (i.e., when the right key is to be ranked the highest) which does not use the Table 3 . The top ranking probability P (rank(k 0 ) = 1) in LC according to (11) , (13) , and the experimental results. normal approximation for order statistics. In this case, the success probability can be expressed directly as
again assuming that the T i counters are independent. A numerical comparison of (11), (13) , and the experimental results is given in Table 3 .
Success Probability in Differential Cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis, developed by Biham and Shamir [1] , is a chosen-plaintext attack that exploits the correlation between the input and output differences of a pair of plaintext blocks encrypted under the same key. The first step in a differential attack is to find a characteristic of the cipher attacked. A characteristic is a sequence of differences between the round inputs in the encryption of two plaintext blocks with a given initial difference. For a characteristic to be useful in an attack, a plaintext pair with the given initial difference must have a non-trivial probability to follow the given sequence of differences during encryption. Having obtained such a characteristic, the attacker collects a large number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs with the given initial difference. Assuming that the characteristic is followed at the inner rounds of the cipher, each pair will suggest a set of candidates for the last round key. When a pair is a "right pair", which followed the characteristic, the actual key will always be among the keys suggested. If the pair is "wrong", it may be detected and discarded, or, otherwise, it will suggest a set of random keys. After processing all collected pairs and counting the keys they suggest, the key value that is suggested most will be taken as the right key. An important measure for the success of a differential attack is the proportion of the probability of the right key being suggested by a right pair to the probability of a random key being suggested by a random pair with the given initial difference. This proportion is called the "signal-to-noise ratio". Biham and Shamir [1] observed a strong relation between the signal-to-noise ratio and the success chance of an attack. By empirical evidence, they suggested that when the signal-to-noise ratio is around 1-2, about 20-40 right pairs would be sufficient; and when the signal-to-noise ratio is much higher, 3-4 right pairs would usually be enough.
Distribution Parameters
We use a notation similar to the one used for linear cryptanalysis: m is the number of key bits attacked; N denotes the total number of pairs analyzed. k 0 denotes the right key, k i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 m − 1, denote the wrong keys. p i is the probability of k i being suggested by a plaintext pair; T i counts the number of times k i is suggested. W i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 m − 1, denote T i , i = 0, sorted in increasing order. The probability of the characteristic is denoted by p, and μ = pN denotes the expected number of right pairs. p r is the average probability of some given key being suggested by a random pair with the given initial difference. S N denotes the signal-to-noise ratio, p/p r .
In our analysis, we assume that the T i values are independent and that they are identically distributed for i = 0. The latter assumption means that all wrong keys have the same chance of being suggested by a random pair. That is, all p i , i = 0, are identical. We denote this probability by p w .
The T i counters have a binomial distribution, B(N, p 0 ) for T 0 and B(N, p w ) for T i , i = 0. We denote these distribution functions by F 0 and F w , and their density functions by f 0 and f w , respectively. Typically, N is very large and therefore these binomial distributions can be approximated by normal distributions, N (μ 0 , σ 2 0 ) and N (μ w , σ 2 w ), where the distribution parameters are,
In a typical differential attack, the right key gets counted by right pairs and also gets random hits from wrong pairs, while the wrong keys only gets hits from wrong pairs. In this case, we have
Note that this typical behavior does not always happen and in certain exceptional cases (e.g., [5] ) the right key gets counted only by right pairs without getting any random hits from wrong pairs. In such attacks, we have p 0 = p. The following analysis assumes the more typical case where p 0 = p + p r but can easily be extended to cases where p 0 = p by substituting p for p 0 in (16) and doing the following derivations accordingly.
Success Probability
In an a-bit advantage attack, success is defined by getting k 0 ranked within the top 2 m−a candidates; that is, T 0 > W 2 m −2 m−a . We denote 2 m − 2 m−a byr. An analysis along the same lines as the one on linear cryptanalysis-with the only major difference being that the T i s here have a normal distribution whereas the Y i s in linear cryptanalysis had a folded normal-gives
The lower bound of the integral can be written in terms of the signal-to-noise ratio as,
Hence, the following result is obtained for the success probability:
Theorem 3. Let P S be the probability that a differential attack on an m-bit key, with a characteristic of probability p and signal-to-noise ratio S N , and with N plaintextciphertext pairs, delivers an a-bit or higher advantage. Assuming that the key counters are independent and that they are identically distributed for all wrong keys, we have,
for sufficiently large m and N , and μ denoting pN ,
A numerical calculation of (17) for S N = 1 and S N = 1000 is given in Table 4 to provide a comparison with Biham and Shamir's empirical results [1] . The values very much agree with their observations for large S N . For small S N , the suggested 20-40 right pairs give a good success rate only for a < 20. To have a good success rate for larger values of a as well, 80 or more right pairs may be needed.
Note that in (17) , when S N is very large, (
Hence, for large S N , we can talk about the success probability as a function of μ only, independent of a, as it was discussed by Biham and Shamir [1] . As in linear cryptanalysis, we can use (17) to get a direct formulation of the required number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs to achieve a certain success probability P S :
Corollary 2. With the assumptions of Theorem 3,
plaintext-ciphertext pairs are needed in a differential attack to accomplish an a-bit advantage with a success probability of P S . 
Alternative Models
It can reasonably be said that the normal approximation for the binomial counters may not be accurate when Np(1 − p) < 4; hence alternative distributions should be considered in the attacks where S N is high and the number of rights pairs is accordingly low. For such attacks, Poisson approximations P(μ 0 ) and P(μ w ) or the original binomial distributions B (N, p 0 ) and B(N, p w ) can be preferred to model the counters. Although more accurate results are possible by the Poisson or binomial distributions, these distributions lack the main advantage of using the normal distribution, which is to provide closed form expressions such as (17) and (18). Besides, as the results in Section 3.4 show, there does not appear to be a significant difference between the results obtained by the normal approximation and those obtained by the original binomial distribution, even for smaller values of μ 0 . Hence, the normal approximation appears to be mostly satisfactory. The experimental results point out a different, more inherent limitation however, which is discussed in Section 3.4.
Probability of Top Ranking
Similar to that in LC, a more precise, direct calculation of the success probability of a differential attack is possible for the special case a = m (i.e., when the right key is to be ranked the highest) which does not use the normal approximation for order statistics:
again assuming the independence of the counters and the normal approximation for the binomial distribution.
Discussion of the Assumptions and Experimental Results
There were three main assumptions employed in developing the results in this section:
1. The binomial T i counters can be approximated by the normal distribution. 2. The T i counters can be taken to be independent. 3. Order statistics can be approximated by the normal distribution.
The normal approximation to the order statistics can be expected to behave similar to that in LC. However, the other two assumptions appear to be less accurate in DC than in LC:
First of all, the binomial counters T i ∼ B (N, p i ) , may not be accurately modeled by the normal distribution unless Np i (1 − p i ) ≥ 4. This may not be so much of a problem for T 0 , since in a differential attack typically 4 or more expected right pairs are used. But for T i , i = 0, the same may not hold true. Especially in attacks with a large S N ratio, Np i (1 − p i ), i = 0, will be much less than 4.
Regarding the assumption of independent counters, in a differential attack, every plaintext-ciphertext pair suggests on average a certain number of key candidates. For instance, in a DES attack, on average 4 keys are suggested per s-box by a plaintextciphertext pair. Consequently, the key counters T i in a differential attack sum up to a certain value, and hence are inherently correlated.
For a practical evaluation of these assumptions, we tested the derived equations in the 6-round DES attack of Biham and Shamir [1] . This attack uses a 3-round characteristic with p = 1/16, S N = 2 16 , and aims to discover 30 bits of the 6th round key, namely the keys of the s-boxes 2, 5, 6, 7, 8. To also test the equations in an attack with a low S N ratio, we took a variant of this attack with the same characteristic where only the key of S5 is attacked. In this variant, we have m = 6, p = 1/8, and S N = 2. The attacks were run 10,000 times for each value of μ. The results are summarized in Fig. 2 . Figure 2 shows that (17) is not as accurate to calculate the success probability as its counterpart in LC. Nevertheless, when a success probability of 99% or higher is of interest, (17) gives a quite reliable estimate for P S . For lower values, the results obtained through (17) may have a 30% or higher error rate.
To trace the source of this error, we first looked into the normal approximation for the binomial distribution. Recall that in formulation of the success probability,
Equation (17) was derived from (20) assuming the normal distribution for f 0 ,
were calculated assuming f w was N (μ w , σ 2 w ). In Fig. 3 , we instead calculated (20) using f 0 = B(N, p 0 ), f w = B(N, p w ) without the normal approximation. 3 The plots show that the results obtained are not much better than those of (17) with the normal approximation. As another source of error, we turned to the normal approximation for the order statistics and, for a comparison, calculated the top ranking probabilities according to (19) which does not make use of this approximation, with f 0 = B(N, p 0 ), f w = B (N, p w ) . The results are shown in Table 5 .
Results of (19), although somewhat better, turn out not to be much more accurate than those of (17) , with a possible error rate as high as 30%. Equation (19) was derived without the normal approximation for the order statistics nor for the binomial distribution, the only major assumption employed being that the key counters T i can be taken to be independent. Hence, it appears that neglecting the dependence of the counters in DC is causing a non-negligible error in the success probability calculation.
This analysis shows that the dependence among the key counters is the principal source of the error observed in this section. As mentioned earlier, each plaintextciphertext pair suggests a certain number of keys in DC, and hence the key counters are inherently correlated. The results demonstrate that treating these counters independently can be a significant source of error in success probability calculations. Note that assuming the key counters to be independent random variables is a very fundamental assumption for any general analysis of the success probability and, therefore, these results point out what appears to be a fundamental limitation of analytical success probability calculations for DC.
On the positive side, the equations derived in this section- (17) , as well as (18), (19), and (20)-can be used reliably as long as the success probability of interest is 99% or higher. The equations can be useful for the lower values of the success probability as well, where they can be used to obtain rough estimates for P S or N .
Conclusions
In this paper, we gave a formal probabilistic model of success in linear and differential cryptanalysis. We also provided efficient formulations that can be used to estimate the success probability of a given attack or to find its plaintext requirement to achieve a certain success level.
Experimental results show that the formulas developed for LC are quite precise, especially when a success probability of 90% or higher is of interest. The formulas appear to be less accurate for DC. The fact that the key counters are inherently correlated constitutes a fundamental difficulty for a simple and general formulation. Nevertheless, the equations derived neglecting this correlation turn out to provide reasonably accurate estimates for the higher values of the success probability. For the lower values, the equations can still be useful to obtain a rough estimate for the success probability or for the plaintext requirement.
It must be noted that, in the analysis for LC, it was assumed that the linear approximation would have a negligible bias for a wrong key. This assumption may not be true for some ciphers (e.g., for RC5 [14] ), in which case the results obtained for the success probability here must be seen as an upper bound rather than an exact estimate, since having a zero bias for the wrong keys constitutes the ideal case for the attacker. On a separate note, our notion of "advantage" does not include the one bit of key information derived in a linear attack from the exclusive-or of the key bits on the right-hand side of the linear approximation. Counting that bit of information-if the bits included in the exclusive-or are not all included among the key bits derived-the advantage of the attack can be seen as a + 1.
There are several significant open problems in analyzing the success probability of cryptanalytic attacks. Finding a more accurate formulation of the success probability in DC than those discussed in this paper would be a significant contribution. Success probability of different kinds of attacks such as differential-linear cryptanalysis [6] , linear cryptanalysis with multiple approximations [4, 9] , boomerang attacks [17] , or attacks with impossible differentials [2, 3] can also be analyzed. On a more general theme, in this paper we discussed the success probability of a simple ranking attack, where the key portion attacked is attacked as a single part using a single ranking procedure. Analyzing the success probability of compound ranking attacks, where parts of the key are derived in separate attacks and then combined (e.g., Matsui's attack on the 16-round DES [12] ), would be an important contribution. In particular, the success probability can be studied according to the optimal key ranking procedure of Junod and Vaudenay [8] for combining independently attacked key bits using a Neyman-Pearson approach.
